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By Louis Henkin. New York: Columbia University Press. 1990. Pp. xi, 220. $29.95.

THE AGE OF RIGHTS

The United States was a leader in developing and promoting an
international consensus that national governments should protect and
guarantee the human rights of their citizens.1 In 1941, as the nation
geared up for World War II, President Roosevelt declared as a national objective "a world founded upon four essential human freedoms": freedom of speech, freedom of religion, freedom from want,
and freedom from fear. 2 A more general understanding of human
rights became a seriously accepted justification for America's full-scale
participation in the war. 3 The Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, adopted by the United Nations in 1948, borrowed heavily
from the U.S. Declaration of Independence and Bill of Rights. 4 In
The Age of Rights, Professor Louis Henkin5 explains how the United
States, by failing to join the primary international human rights agreements and by failing to accept the existence of economic and social
1. "For Americans - our common usurpation for the inhabitants of the United States - the
idea of rights is an old friend, and we tend to think of it - with some arrogating exaggeration as our contribution to mankind." P. x; see also Andrzej Rapaczynski, Bibliographical Essay:
The Influence of U.S. Constitutionalism Abroad, in CoNSTITUTIONALISM AND RIGHTS 405
(Louis Henkin & Albert J. Rosenthal eds., 1990).
2. President's Address to Congress of Jan. 6, 1941, 87 CoNG. R.Ec. 44, 46-47 (1941).
Roosevelt told Congress:
The first is freedom of speech and expression everywhere in the world.
The second is freedom of every person to worship God in his own way everywhere in the
world.
The third is freedom from want ..••
The fourth is freedom from fear •..•
Id.
3. "During the War, the Allied powers had proclaimed that assuring respect for human
rights was their war aim." P. 1. The role of the United States as a defender of human rights
during World War II is still recognized today:
Twice in this century, the world has been threatened by catastrophe. Twice this catas·
trophe was born in Europe, and twice you Americans along with others were called upon to
save Europe, the whole world and yourselves.••.
. • . [The U.S.] became the most powerful nation on earth, and it understood the respon·
sibility that flowed from this.
Vaclav Havel, Excerpts From Czech Chief's Address to Congress, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 1990, at
A14 (translation).
4. See Adamantia Pollis & Peter Schwab, Human Rights: A Western Construct with Limited
Applicability, in HUMAN RIGHTS: CULTURAL AND IDEOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 1-4 (Adamantia Pollis & Peter Schwab eds., 1979).
5. University Professor Emeritus and Special Service Professor, Columbia University, and
Chairman, Directorate, the Center for the Study of Human Rights. In addition to his academic
career, Professor Henkin has served in the U.S. Department of State and for the United Nations.
He is the author of several books, including: FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION
(1972); How NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY (1972); and THE RIGHTS OP
MAN TODAY (1981).
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rights as a matter of domestic policy, now trails much of the world in
recognizing a full range of human rights.
In this collection of essays and speeches published or presented
over the past decade, Henkin provides a thorough and readable explanation of how international rights developed and how they reflect our
constitutional notions of individual rights. The Age of Rights does not
present innovative arguments; rather, it provides a forum for Professor
Henkin, a leading authority in the field of international human rights,
to expound on the rights debate. As a collection of essays, however,
the book suffers from certain structural problems. Throughout the
book Henkin repeats arguments made in the earliest included essays
- a necessary device for the individual pieces, but distracting to one
reading the entire work. More seriously, the essays were published
before the revolutions in Eastern Europe and the collapse of the
U.S.S.R. Although these occurrences may not challenge Henkin's
conception of rights, they necessarily leave his analysis dated.
In the first section, "International Human Rights," Henkin provides a philosophical and moral underpinning for his definition of international human rights, places the relatively new concept in its
historical context, and expands on several of the more difficult issues.
While relatively uncontroversial, the essays in the first section are valuable as clear and authoritative analyses of the present status of
human rights in the international legal system.
International human rights are relatively new, legally and philosophically. Henkin cites as their origin a psychological, moral, and
political consensus, born out of the World War II experience, that the
treatment of fellow human beings is a concern of "everyone, everywhere. "6 Human rights became part of the international legal structure through two postwar processes: incorporation into the
constitutions of virtually all nations and codification into a series of
international legal instruments, such as the Nuremburg Charter, the
U.N. Charter, and the Universal Convention on Human Rights. This
evolution of the concept of international human rights as a product of
the consent of nations to international treaties results in some significant differences between our views of domestic constitutional rights
and of international rights. As Henkin writes, "for American constitutionalism, the individual had natural rights before the Constitution,
before government was established" (p. 144). By contrast, international human rights, dependent upon the consent of national governments, cannot be said to "precede" government. Furthermore,
international human rights are enumerated in several international in6. P. 16. Examples of concern for the human rights of individuals other than national citizens do predate World War II. For instance, the international abolitionist movement was active
as early as the beginning of the eighteenth century, presumably out of concern for the human
rights of Africans taken as slaves. P. 15.
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struments; there has yet to develop a need for judicial interpretation to
give them substance.
In addition to offering a philosophical basis for international
human rights, Henkin provides a detailed historical account of the
evolving attitude of the U.S. government toward international human
rights (Essay 5, pp. 65-80). In particular, he grants a behind-thescenes description of the conflicts within the State Department and
between the Congress and the Executive Branch. He also briefly discusses several other international human rights issues, including: the
lack of institutional remedies for international human rights violations
(Essay 2, pp. 31-41 ); the rights of aliens and immigrants (Essay 3, pp.
43-50 & Essay 8, pp. 127-40); and the problems of nonintervention
and domestic jurisdiction (Essay 4, pp. 51-64).
In the second group of essays, "Rights in the United States," Henkin isolates two deep problems with our constitutional jurisprudence
reflected in federal judicial decisionmaking, in congressional action,
and even in law school teaching about the Constitution. 7 First, Henkin argues that since the inception of judicial review courts have paid
too much attention to the text of the Constitution, ignoring the underlying theory of rights that informed its creation. 8 Second, this overly
textual approach functions poorly because the Constitution was not
written to perform its modem role as "the constitution of a powerful
national government largely subordinating state governments and itself governing the people" (p. 91). The Constitution is therefore a
"congenitally flawed" document. It fails to provide adequate textual
support for certain individual rights, leaving judges to find such protections in the imperfect Due Process Clause. 9
To compensate, Henkin attempts to revive the original Jeffersonian
notion of "a constitution as social compact, retained rights, government for agreed-upon purposes" (p. 91). He explains that, as a social
agreement, the Constitution must be renewed, or readopted, by each
generation. As a result, modem ideas about the federal government
- such as its role in satisfying economic needs - should now be incorporated in our collective vision of constitutional rights.
7. "Doubtless as the result of judicial neglect, law schools teach constitutional law as though
the Constitution has no theory, and some students of the law may be surprised to learn - and
some may deny - that it has one." P. 83.
8. "We were condemned to be textualists, 'interpretivists'; other parts of our hagiography notably the Declaration of Independence - were excluded from the jurisprudential canon; ancestral theory might sneak in, but only occasionally, and in the guise of construction of the
constitutional text." P. 91.
9. Henkin has argued this point elsewhere:
Except for the right to vote we have not added explicitly to the rights protected by the
Constitution, but individual claims, imaginative counsel, and judicial exegesis have transformed rights probably beyond what the framers of the Bill of Rights, and even the framers
of the Fourteenth Amendment, would have recognized.
Louis HENKIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM, DEMOCRACY, AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS 96 (1990).
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In the third and final group of essays, "Rights: Here and There,"
Henkin contrasts U.S. constitutional rights with international human
rights. Although Americans tend to view human rights as intellectual
and political products that we export to other nations, 10 there are clear
differences in the substance oLU.S. and international rights. 11 These
differences, according to Henkin, can be traced to their different conceptual origins.
International human rights are not a priori, and depend upon the
consent of national governments; if governments refuse to recognize
them, they cease to exist. As a result, Henkin sees a task of international lawyers and politicians interested in human rights to promote
the idea of national governmental responsibility for protecting human
rights. He writes, "[t]he purpose of international political and legal
preoccupation with human rights, and of recognizing their quality as
rights of some order, is to help obtain for them the quality of legal
rights in domestic societies and to enhance the likelihood that they
will be enjoyed in fact" (p. 32).
This emphasis on promoting the recognition of human rights belies
a basic inconsistency in Henkin's scheme. On the one hand, he attributes to international human rights the same "weight" as domestic
rights. At the same time, he is aware that the existence of international human rights depends on governmental acceptance. Henkin
never seems to resolve this inconsistency, resorting instead to a functional approach, terming a potential entitlement a "right" only when it
is helpful to his argument. 12 While this may be a necessary approach
to what is essentially a developing body of legal thought, 13 it weakens
10. See supra note 1.
11. The distinctions Henkin considers most important, and describes most completely, are
the fortunate lack of provisions in the Constitution for the suspension of its protections in time of
emergency, and the unfortunate absences of a statement of equality and of protections against
violations of the individual rights by other private individuals. See generally Essay 9, pp. 143-56.
12. For instance, in discussing economic rights Henkin writes:
Adequate food and other necessities, however, are surely fundamental, and essential to
human dignity. The argument against treating them as rights was that they depended on
available resources and large national policies and could not be enforced by the means available for enforcing civil-political rights. Treating them as rights, therefore, would only dilute
international efforts to obtain respect for civil and political rights.
P. 33 n.*.
13. Some argue that fretting over this question is unnecessary because sufficient common
ground exists among different political cultures regarding the basic core of human rights. See
DAVID P. FORSYTHE, HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PoLmcs 182, 187-88 (2d ed. 1989). Henkin seems willing to accept the philosophical ambiguity:
[I]nternational discourse seems to see human rights in one or more of the following ways:
a. as "goods," desiderata, that are not rights but that might be translated into legal rights
in domestic or international law;
b. as moral rights in an accepted moral order (or under some natural law), the individual
having "claims" to freedoms and basic needs, seen perhaps as claims upon the moral order,
or the universe, or God;
c. as moral (or natural law) claims by every individual upon his society; or
d. as legal claims upon his society under its constitutional system and law.
P. 32.
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the argument for full recognition of international human rights in two
ways.
First, Henkin's theory is susceptible to the frequent criticism that
international human rights are essentially a Western concept, and
therefore not applicable or acceptable to non-Western cultures that do
not share a "rights tradition." 14 Henkin addresses this criticism in the
Epilogue, when discussing the problem of conflicting religious, political, and moral systems. He concludes that all societies share some
common ground: "[T]here is now a working consensus that every
man and woman, between birth and death, counts, and has a claim to
an irreducible core of integrity and dignity. In that consensus, in the
world we have and are shaping, the idea of human rights is the essential idea" (p. 193). Although inspiring, this position dodges the argument that a "working consensus" is a description of agreement, rather
than a reason for agreement, and therefore lacks persuasive value.
Second, the disjunction between the theoretical underpinnings of
domestic and international human rights weakens the book's most significant and controversial position, Henkin's persistent and persuasive
advocacy for the acceptance of economic and social rights in U.S. foreign policy and as U.S. constitutional rights. Henkin explains that
economic rights are not a new concept in U.S. political debate. As
early as 19'44, President Roosevelt spoke of an economic Bill of Rights
in his State of the Union message: "In our day these economic truths
have become accepted as self-evident. We have accepted, so to speak,
a second Bill of Rights under which a new basis of security and prosperity can be established for all." 15 Nevertheless, they have been rejected in both domestic constitutional law jurisprudence 16 and U.S.
14. See Polls & Schwab, supra note 4, at 14-15.
Efforts to impose the [Universal Declaration of Human Rights] as it currently stands not
only reflect a moral chauvinism and ethnocentric bias but are also bound to fail ••••
• • . If the notion of human rights is to be a viable universal concept it will be necessary to
analyze the differing cultural and ideological conceptions of human rights and the impact of
one on the other.
15. Roosevelt continued:
Among these are:
The right to a useful and remunerative job in the industries, or shops or farms or mines
of the Nation;
The right to earn enough to provide adequate food and clothing and recreation;
The right to adequate medical care and the opportunity to achieve and enjoy good
health;
The right to adequate protection from the economic fears of old age, sickness, accident,
and unemployment;
The right to a good education.
President's Message to Congress of Jan. 11, 1944, 90 CONG. REC. 55, 57 (1944).
16. See Robert H. Bork, The Impossibility ofFinding Welfare Rights in the Constitution, 1979
WASH. U. L.Q. 695; Martha H. Good, Freedom from Want: The Failure of United States Courts
to Protect Subsistence Rights, 6 HUM. Rrs. Q. 335 (1984).
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foreign policy. 17
The latter rejection is most clearly demonstrated by Congress' refusal to ratify the International Covenant on Economic, Cultural and
Social Rights. As the only major Western nation not to accept this
international agreement, 18 the United States is hard pressed to assert
its continued role as human rights standard bearer.. According to
Henkin, the sources of the resistance to acceptance of the Covenant19
include a devotion to representative democracy over satisfaction of
human needs; strains of isolationism; and a belief that rights in the
United States are satisfied more completely than in other nations, excusing the U.S. from its international obligations (p. 77). Opposition
to the Covenant, according to Henkin, is an outdated position.
Let there be no doubt. The United States is now a welfare state. Commitment to some minimum levels of individual welfare may not be of
constitutional rank but it is deeply, ineradicably imbedded in our national life. . . . To the world, moreover, whatever the United States does
in fact, it does not proclaim a national commitment in principle to meeting basic human needs. Americans are frequently reminded that our
eighteenth-century philosophy, our kind of democracy, our national hagiography, show the United States committed to protecting property, but
not to alleviating hunger, even of our own people. [p. 153]

As with other arguments in the book, Henkin is persuasive and impassioned in his defense of economic, social, and cultural rights. Unfortunately, his argument for their domestic recognition reveals more about
his perceptions of what should be our collective moral sensibilities
than it does about traditional notions of "rights." It may therefore fail
to persuade those who instinctively believe that economic rights just
don't exist.
Professor Henkin has long been an advocate for recognition and
application of the concept of human rights. The Age of Rights, while
offering little in the way of new arguments, and sometimes lacking in

17. "It is true that the state must establish a legal framework which encourages fairness and
prohibits fraud; but, having done so, the state must then get out of the way and permit individuals to live their own lives as they see fit." Ambassador Patricia M. Byrne, Statement to the Third
Committee of the U.N. General Assembly (Nov. 9, 1988), quoted in Philip Alston, U.S. Ratification of the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: The Need for an Entirely New
Strategy, 84 AM. J. INTL. L. 365, 374 (1990).
18. As of January 1, 1990, 93 nations had become parties to the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, yet the United States remains a holdout. RICHARD B.
LILLICH, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS 180.25-180.26 (2d ed. 1990).
19. Initially, some critics charged that joining the Covenant would unconstitutionally violate
states' rights, interfere with congressional power, and affect matters of strictly domestic concern.
Henkin dismisses these objections, writing that "[e]ach of these legal objections was long ago
refuted." P. 76.
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analysis of competing views, is a comprehensive and accessible presentation of the views of a leading scholar in the field.
-

Stephen D. Sencer

